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| Detailed information |
| Original study plan |
Master's programme Economic and Business Analytics 2019W |
| Objectives |
The goal of this course is to offer a micro-economic approach to the internal organization of firms. It starts from the simple premise that people respond to incentives, and that they do so in predictable ways. Important questions covered in this course include how to find the right employees, how managers can design incentives to get employees to do what they want them to do, or how the structure of a firm should be designed.
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| Subject |
- An introduction to Game Theory
- Moral Hazard: Definition and effect on optimal incentive and insurance schemes
- Adverse Selection: Definition and effect on hiring process
- Commitment Problems: The importance of credibility
- Organizational Design: Firm boundaries, hierarchies and authority
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| Criteria for evaluation |
Final exam, participation in class
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| Methods |
Lecture, discussion of case studies, exercises
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| Language |
English |
| Study material |
- Bolton, P., Dewatripont, M. (2004), Contract Theory, MIT Press
- Gibbons, R., Roberts, J. (2012), The Handbook of Organizational Economics, Princeton University Press
- Laffont, J-J., Martimort, D. (2002), The Theory of Incentives, Princeton University Press
- Mas-Colell, A., Whinston, M., Green, J. (1995), Microeconomic Theory, Oxford University Press
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| Changing subject? |
No |
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